

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200070037-2

18 APRIL 1980

(FOUO 2/80)

1 OF 1

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/9044

18 April 1980

# USSR Report

HUMAN RESOURCES

(FOUO 2/80)



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

For further information on report content call (703) 351-2938 (economic); 3468 (political, sociological, military); 2726 (life sciences); 2725 (physical sciences).

COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/9044

18 April 1980

USSR REPORT  
HUMAN RESOURCES

(FOUO 2/80)

CONTENTS

PAGE

LABOR

Labor Use and Allocation Analyzed in Book  
(N.S. Kistanova; VOPROSY EKONOMIKI, Jan 80)..... 1

DEMOGRAPHY

Aspects of Demographic Development of USSR  
(T. Abubakarov; IZVESTIYA AKADEMII NAUK TURKMENSKOY SSR.  
SERIYA OBOBSCHESTVENNYKH NAUK, No 5, 1979)..... 3

Economic Costs, Effects of Resettlement From Rural Areas  
Weighed

(A.I. Alekseyev, et al; VESTNIK MOSKOVSKOGO  
GOSUDARSTVENNOGO UNIVERSITETA, SERIYA GEOGRAFIYA,  
No 1, 1980).....12

- a -

[III - USSR - 38c FOUO]

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

LABOR

LABOR USE AND ALLOCATION ANALYZED IN BOOK

Moscow VOPROSY EKONOMIKI in Russian No 1, Jan 80 p 145-146

[Review by A. Danilov of the book "Regional'noye Ispol'zovaniye Trudovykh Resursov" by N. S. Kistanova, Izdatel'stvo Nauka, 1978, 135 pages]

[Text] The monograph is devoted to the regional utilization of living labor in the regions of Siberia and the Far East.

The extent to which the interrelationship of the processes of the movement of labor forces and the distribution of production are in compliance with regulations is analyzed in the first chapter. Situations where available labor resources do not correspond to the magnitude of the natural and economic potential specified for effective exploitation are regarded by the author as regions which have a surplus or an insufficiency of labor resources (page 12). Giving attention to the importance of the correlation of the intensive and extensive factors of production throughout separate regions, N. Kistanova suggests that intensification is not always linked just with the modernization of operating enterprises, but that extensive growth is connected with the construction of new ones. The huge new enterprises in Siberia often provide a higher level of labor productivity than those being modernized in "old" regions (page 15).

The state of the economy and the dynamics of the population and the labor resources of Siberia and the Far East are described in the second chapter. The author comes to the conclusion that basic directions in the utilization of the work force correspond to regional zone specialization in the national economy of the country, although there are still huge reserves here connected with making fuller and more effective use of the natural resources of this rich land. Their realization creates prerequisites for the achievement of higher technical and economic indicators including the substantial improvement of the use of living labor (page 45).

In the third chapter the basic conditions for the rational use of labor resources are investigated, conditions which have a bearing on scientific and technical progress and the improvement of the industrial and territorial structure of the economy. The direction of the technical improvement of

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

production in Siberia and the Far East are examined in detail in the work. In the planning of technical progress in a territorial section, it is proposed that regions for new economic exploitation be especially earmarked, setting forth for them preferential norms of payment for resources and heightened norms of withholding for material stimulation funds. Based on calculations, N. Kistanova shows the possibilities for the further development of the specialization of a zone into energetics and energy-consuming industries and substantiates the necessity for restraining the development of labor-intensive branches of industry there.

Applying the traditional balance method in the regional investigation of labor resources, the author amplifies on the effectiveness of the territorial utilization of labor resources with her technical and economic analysis. The fourth chapter is devoted to those questions where the method of evaluating the comparative effect of the drawing of labor resources into various industries of the economic region is substantiated. This method essentially consists of ranking the industrial indicators of the difference of derivative costs in a given and alternative regions into one indicator. Besides the basic indicators (production and transportation), additional costs are included in these indicators (construction for living quarters and personal service facilities and the transfer of workers). The results of the calculation are presented as a series of industries ranked in descending order of their expenditures, illustrating the comparative effect of the utilization of the work force in various industries of the region and the over-all effectiveness of their disposition (page 81).

Sources for the replenishment and methods for the consolidation of labor resources are examined in the concluding fifth chapter. Analyzing the utilization of inter-regional labor resources and the attraction of labor forces from without, the author touches on the problem of inter-regional labor reserves which are earmarked as over-all regional forces (resources of industries and enterprises in a given region) and special regional forces linked to the level of the utilization of specific equipment and to the particularities of the industrial structure of the economy (page 104).

On the whole, the monograph is of interest to specialists both in the area of allocation and in the problems of labor economy.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Pravda", "Voprosy ekonomiki", 1980

8885  
CSO: 1828

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY

ASPECTS OF DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENT OF USSR

Ashkhabad IZVESTIYA AKADEMII NAUK TURKMENSKOY SSR. SERIYA OBSHCHESTVENNYKH NAUK in Russian No 5, 1979 pp 34-40

[Article by T. Abubakarov, Economic Department of Moscow University imeni M. V. Lomonosov: "Some Aspects of Regional Demographic Development of the USSR Population (Using the Northern Caucasus as an Example)"]

[Text] A general population census that was concluded in January 1979 is an important document that reflects the enormous changes in the life of the Soviet people that have occurred since the last census in 1970. Undoubtedly specialists will be interested in this document for studying so-called purely demographic parameters of the population such as composition according to sex and age, distribution of population, family status, etc. The country's planning organs will receive exhaustive material on the size of the population and of the working population, which is especially important today with the shortage of labor resources.

The reasons for this deficit are some negative phenomena in our economy on the one hand resulting in the inefficient utilization of existing labor resources, and on the other hand the problem of labor resources is related to a great degree to the change of the demographic behavior of the population itself, which has revealed more and more of a tendency toward moderate reproduction. Moreover, whereas the factors involved in economics are of a temporary, transitory nature and for this reason can be eliminated, the changes in the demographic behavior are a result of the lives of many generations and are thus long-term in nature. This circumstance must be considered in any study of the demographic situation that has developed in the USSR in recent years. It is commonly believed that the basis for this phenomenon is the tendency of the decreasing birth rate in the population. Such an interpretation of the problem would be of practical significance only if the birth rate were not related to other demographic processes of existence. Actually it is impossible to isolate birth rate and to study it without relating it to the components of the concept "demographic behavior."

In scientific circles there already exists an understanding of the necessity to change from the isolated study of demographic processes to their integrated study in the family's demography. As an example we can refer to

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

the well-known statement of D. I. Valentey, who wrote: "A thorough study of the tendencies of birth rate assumes the study of problems related to the position and role of the family under conditions of developed socialism" (4, p 6).

Demographic processes in various sections of the country vary in intensity. This is a characteristic based on the richness of the ethnic composition of our population. Thus the role of these processes in forming demographic situations differs. However, from a strictly theoretical point of view the data on differences does not have to shade their general thrust toward smoothing. In this regard the Northern Caucasus is a unique region. Of the more than 100 nationalities of the USSR, no less than half are concentrated here.

All external social conditions being equal the specifics of demographic phenomena, whether it is the birth rate or the insignificant migratory mobility, should not be examined as a phenomenon that is intrinsic to a particular population. "A high birth rate," writes G. A. Bondarskaya, "were characteristic of all people at certain stages of their socio-economic development. Consequently, it cannot be considered a distinctive feature intrinsic to a particular people," (3, p 9).

Among the factors that have exacerbated the current demographic situation in the USSR the fall in the birth rate is given primary significance. The question arises: Is this drop an objectively-based process or is it the result of the accidental concurrence of unfavorable factors? The regularity of any process is manifested firstly in time. The more stable a tendency is for a long period of time, the less basis there is to consider it accidental.

During a half-century (1926-1975) the population of the Northern Caucasus increased from 9.1 million to 15.0 million people, or by 164.8 percent. At the same time the proportion of the population of the Northern Caucasus to the total population of the USSR remained approximately the same: in 1926--5.5 percent; 1939--5.4; 1959--5.5; 1970--5.9; and 1975--5.9 percent (13, p 253).

For the sake of comparison we will say that the proportion of the population of all the republics of Central Asia to that of the entire USSR increased from 4.7 percent in 1926 to 9.0 percent in 1975 (13, p 255). There is no doubt that changes in the nature of reproduction have played a certain role in the constancy of the proportion of the Northern Caucasian population. In approximately this same period (1926-1974) the dynamics of the birth rate level in the Northern Caucasus changed in the following way per 1,000 persons: in 1926--35.5 persons;<sup>1</sup> in 1940--33.1; 1950--22.1; 1960--24.0; 1970--16.3; and in 1974--16.7 persons.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Calculated by counting the number of children up to 1 year of age per 1,000 population according to the 1926 census (6, p 168).

<sup>2</sup>Calculated according to the data (12, p 46, 47; 18, p 77; 19, p 82).



## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Even according to strictly comparable data the birth rate of the population of the Northern Caucasus has dropped from 33.1 percent in 1940 to 16.7 percent in 1974, or by almost 50 percent. Such a twofold decrease in the birth rate leaves little hope that it will return to 1940 levels in the future. For the so-called indigenous population of the Northern Caucasus, which includes the representatives of national minorities, the indicators for birth rate calculated according to traditional methods are either absent in the majority of cases or cannot be used in comparisons because of the differences in the reference base of the calculations. For this reason the detected tendency can be revealed by comparing the indicators for the birth rate of the village population in a region with a consideration of the fact that most of the indigenous population lives in these villages (Table 1).

Table 1  
Birth Rate of the Village Population in the Northern Caucasus  
(Number of Births per 1,000 Persons) (15, p 12)

Region	1950	1960	1966	1970
Northern Caucasus	23.0	27.5	20.3	17.4
Including				
Krasnodarskiy Kray	23.0	23.0	15.0	13.7
Stavropol'skiy Kray	22.1	24.6	17.4	14.6
Rostovskaya Oblast	20.8	19.3	13.2	12.7
Dagestanskaya ASSR	29.5	43.5	37.9	32.5
Kabardino-Balkarskaya ASSR	20.4	33.2	27.8	20.8
Severo-Osetinskaya ASSR	19.0	24.8	18.9	15.7
Checheno-Ingushskaya ASSR	27.8	39.2	28.2	23.1

Although the table shows the various intensities with which the birth rate has dropped in regions with a majority of Russian-Ukrainian and indigenous populations, nevertheless in the latter the indicator under analysis is beginning to slowly drop. The reasons for such an ethnic differentiation in birth rate in the country have been discussed broadly in demographic literature and in most cases they are of a transient nature. The main thing is that the drop in the birth rate level is occurring in various groups of the population with varying intensity.

We of course cannot assert that this tendency acts at any given moment as an immutable systematically-functioning process. Not only can there be divergences, they are apparently unavoidable, especially with regard to the lesser peoples of the Northern Caucasus. Thus, the results of the survey conducted in 1972 showed that "the women of the main nationalities of the autonomous republics are standing up for limiting the number of children with an orientation toward families with few children," (16, p 22). Even so, some nationalities differ quite significantly in their reproductive behavior. Whereas the people of Severo-Osetinskaya ASSR are closer to the peoples that have a low birth rate, those of Kabardino-Balkarskaya ASSR occupy a more intermediate position, thereby separating one type of reproductive behavior from another. The peoples of Checheno-Ingushskaya ASSR and Dagestanskaya ASSR, on the other hand, maintain the tradition of a high birth rate (16, p 23).

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

All of these peoples, in addition to being neighbors, have similar histories of socio-economic development and find themselves in practically identical conditions of development at the present time. Apparently, covert national characteristics sometimes supercede the conditions that might negate them. Moreover, the latter may not always be identical. In Dagestan, for example, even the expenditures from public consumer funds per person, which under conditions of socialism should theoretically not be related to the territorial level of socio-economic development, in 1970 comprised only 69 percent of the levels in Rostovskaya Oblast (17, p 75).

Consequently, insofar as real life confirms the idea that the demographic status of a population is determined by the level of development of socio-economic factors we are correct in "writing off" the rise in the indicators of the birth rate in the national rayons of the Northern Caucasus to their lag in technical and economic progress. Population specialists from OON [Department of Social Sciences of Academy of Sciences, USSR] write even more categorically on this subject. "With some exceptions," they write, "the higher the gross coefficient of reproduction the lower the average level of economic and social development as measured by various indicators," (8, p 262).

Although we do not accept this conclusion unconditionally it still has a certain meaning and is confirmed by data from the USSR to a certain degree. The gross coefficient of reproduction in 1958-1959 in the RSFSR was 1.27 and in Turkmenkaya SSR--2.48; in 1974-1975--0.98 and 2.83 respectively (11, p 7). In other words, in the Turkmen SSR, which lags somewhat behind the RSFSR in the level of socio-economic development, most of the population practically is not limiting reproduction.

Undoubtedly in the national regions of the Northern Caucasus, especially in rural areas, the picture will be significantly closer to the data of the Turkmen SSR than to that of the RSFSR. This can be evaluated indirectly by the value of the gross reproduction coefficient in Dagestan, which in 1970 in rural areas was 2,623 and in cities--1,128 (5, p 9). However, no matter how specific the differences in the reproduction levels of the population, from the point of view of the goals that were expressed in the given article more importance should be attributed to the conclusion that the ethnic differences in birth rate "have begun to decrease gradually" (16, p 35), including among the nationalities of the fourth ethnic group, which includes the indigenous peoples of the Northern Caucasus, where "the number of children is already being limited," (16, p 30).

Thus, an analysis of the data provides us with a basis for supposing that the drop in the birth rate in the Northern Caucasus, which is occurring with varying intensity in various ethnic groups, is unavoidable and not accidental. In very general terms this is related to the reorientation of new generations of families to limit the number of children in cities as well as in rural areas (Table 2).

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Table 2  
Dynamics of Average-Size Family<sup>1</sup>  
(1970 in % of 1959)

Region	City Population	Rural Population	Total Population
Krasnodarskiy Kray	100.0	97.0	97.0
Stavropol'skiy Kray	100.0	100.0	100.0
Rostovskaya Oblast	97.0	97.0	97.0
Adygeyskaya Autonomous Oblast	100.0	100.0	100.0
Karachayevo-Cherkesskaya Autonomous Oblast	103.0	107.0	102.0
Dagestanskaya ASSR	108.0	122.0	115.0
Kabardino-Balkarskaya ASSR	103.0	112.0	105.0
Severo-Osetinskaya ASSR	102.0	102.0	102.0
Checheno-Ingushskaya ASSR	108.0	124.0	118.0
Northern Caucasus	100.0	105.0	100.0

The average family size in Stavropol'skiy Kray and in Adygeyskaya Autonomous Oblast remained unchanged for 10 years in all categories of the population; in Rostovskaya Oblast it decreased by 3 percent; in Krasnodarskiy Kray the size of the city family did not change, but that of the rural family decreased by 3 percent.

There is a totally different picture in the national oblasts of the Northern Caucasus. Here there has been a tendency toward an increase in the average size of the family. In general the data in the table shows a somewhat-altered variant of the universal phenomenon--even when there is an increase in the size of the family, the city "objects" more to this process than the village. If we take the size of the city families of indigenous populations as the standard, then the corresponding indicator in the rural area is an average of 12.1 percent higher than in the city. The ratio of these factors is 1:1 for Avars people, i.e. the size of the city families corresponds fully to the size of rural families. On the other hand, in Cherkessiya, Kabardinsk and Karachayevsk the size of city families is 24 percent lower than that of rural families.

Thus, some representatives of indigenous peoples living in cities have lost the ties with the tradition of having many children per family and with conditions in which the old norms of reproductive behavior would be reformed. As the results of much research show, this phenomenon is common to any population living in cities which has lost a firm tie with the village. However, if we judge by the censuses of 1959 and 1970, not all categories of the population of the Northern Caucasus has moved to a low birth rate. The intensity with which the size of the family in the city is changing enables us to formulate ideas about the future general behavior of families regarding the number of children.

<sup>1</sup>The table was composed from the works (9, pp 442-444; 10, pp 212-213).

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The question arises: Is this process accidental? Of course only the results of the latest (1979) census will enable us to answer this unequivocally. However, from the theoretical point of view and on the basis of our preceding discussion it is possible already now to provide an answer, although this presupposes the elucidation of a more general mechanism for the action of factors which provide the basis for the given tendency. In addition we should remember that in its effect on the level of the birth rate the effect of one factor sometimes neutralizes that of another. For this reason it is probably not possible in an isolated analysis of influences to determine which factors act equally.

The solution can be found in the study of a public institution in which the aforementioned factors would be woven into a mechanism of interactions. In our opinion the family is such an institution. F. Engels called it a "molecule of society (2, p 51), or the "simplest and primary form of social ties for the aim of production," (1, p 98). F. Engels discusses the goals of the family based on monogamy: 1) economic--producing the means of production and consumer well-being on the basis of private property and private housework and transmitting them through offspring; 2) reproduction--continuing the line through the children (1, p 2). These family goals could not be self-contained while the level of joint production depended on the number of children in the family. And conversely, the production of children within the same framework did not have a purpose without the assumption of the combined labor process in the future.

The absolute interrelationship of the aforementioned goals made the independent and conscious destruction of the family an almost hopeless goal. The relationship between the great solidity of the family and the large family size was objectively secured through the very nature of people's activities. In the Northern Caucasus, for example, even in 1926 the proportion of family members helping in work to the total number of individuals having purely agricultural occupations was 66.8 percent; and in national okrugs--64.4 percent (6, pp 286-293). In other words, the agricultural activities of the population, over 90 percent of which lived in rural areas, occurred primarily within the framework of the family. In this we have the extensive participation of women and children in production. The economic stimulation of parents to have children to secure production, even within the framework of simple reproduction, is existant here.

Consequently, concentrating production within the framework of the family plus the sum total of circumstances which did not allow the woman to overstep the very limited framework of social activities were the reasons for the solid family-marital relations on the one hand and for the large family size, frequently purposefully so, on the other. For this reason in quantitative terms divorces were rare. According to our calculations in the entire population of the Northern Caucasus in 1897 the number of divorced per 1,000 population was only 0.33 people,<sup>1</sup> and in 1926--2.5 people.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Calculated from book (6, p 431). Calculations were based on the idea that the number of divorced people is double the number of divorces.

<sup>2</sup>Calculated by the same method.

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The period of limiting personal property and the simultaneous period of collectivization in our country meant the mass socialization of labor, primarily in agriculture, which in itself created a new, higher productivity of public labor. Another important result of the political socialization of labor was the formation of a new molecule in the formation of the village equal to one found in the city--the production collective. Labor in the collective basically alters the social status of men and women, and the more acute the change, the more women participate in public production. For this reason in the city the public status of women is progressing more rapidly than in the village based on the very nature of urban production with its foundation in collective labor of large masses of people.

With the arrival of the epoch of the socialized form of labor the economic bases for the existence of old large families are eroded. The conditions which secured the unity of the two basic family goals are gradually receding into the past, leaving behind the growth of family instability. The relationship between the goals is lost, as is the common goal of the family. If the economic possibilities of marriage partners are great, the dissolution of the marriage does not mean a loss of independence for the partners, so that the potential stability of the family is lost. This circumstance was noted by A. I. Gozulovyy with regard to the Northern Caucasus. "The independent sources of the means of existence," he writes, "play a decisive role in divorce, especially in the youthful years," (6, p 425). We feel that the following dynamics of divorces in the Northern Caucasus per 1,000 population are not accidental: in 1897--0.33 people divorced; in 1926--2.5; 1940--1.4; 1950--0.4; 1960--1.6; 1965--1.9; 1970--3.3 and 1973--3.3 persons.<sup>3</sup>

It is true that some people feel that in the national republics of the Northern Caucasus there has been no tendency toward an increase in divorces (14, p 30). Here the situation is much more complex. First of all, the divorce statistics include only those of ZAGS [Civil registry office] documents on divorces, which do not have to be filed. Secondly, in the national republics of the region where over half of the indigenous population lives in rural areas, the practice of obtaining these documents is even less widespread. In addition, with indigenous peoples there are still cases in which marriages and divorces are not registered at all or are registered very late. For this reason the actual number of divorces and marriages among the indigenous population is significantly higher than those that are officially registered.

In presenting the mechanism for the interrelationship of factors acting simultaneously to decrease the birth rate coefficient and the stability of the family we primarily noted the economic reasons for the process. There are also derivative reasons. These include the fact that "the woman fears being left alone with children and the spouses do not want to be tied down with many children in view of potential possibilities for divorce," (7, p 145). Data for 1940-1973 is based on the works (12, pp 46-47; 18, p 77; 19, p 82).

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Thus, the old method with which the unification of the basic goals of the family occurred is not possible now except in the rural family perhaps in a truncated, limited form. An entire system of measures is possible to make the urban family more stable and to increase the number of children in the family. The literature presents a complete system of economic measures. It is noteworthy, however, that their gradual implementation in our country is being accompanied by a drop in the birth rate and a growth in divorces. This is proof that once the economic bases for the formation of families has changed, their regulation by means of purely-economic factors already cannot be justified. Apparently it is time to propagandize the essential stereotype of familial behavior on a scale of the entire society. This is an integral part of demographic policy, the necessity of which was discussed by L. I. Brezhnev in the review speech at the 25th CPSU Congress.

In our opinion this is the schematic presentation of the objective mechanism of the interrelationship of factors resulting in the changes in the demographic behavior of the population. Of course, real life is limitlessly richer than any scheme. Divergences, and sometimes essential ones, are unavoidable. Nevertheless, as a whole the aforementioned tendency has an objective basis.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Marx, K., Engels, F. "Sochineniya" [Works], vol 21.
2. Marx, K., Engels, F. "Sochineniya," vol 20.
3. Bondarskaya, G. A. "Rozhdayemost' v SSSR" [The Birth Rate in the USSR], Moscow, 1977.
4. Valentey, D. I. "Problemy uprevleniya protsessami razvitiya narodonaseleniya" [Problems in the Management of the Processes of Developing the National Population], VOPROSY FILOSOFII, 1978, no 2.
5. Gadzhiyev, A. G., et. al. "Voprosy ispol'zovaniya trudovykh resursov Dagestanskoy ASSR" [Questions in Utilizing the Labor Resources of the Dagestanskaya ASSR], Makhachkala, 1976.
6. Gozulov, A. I. "Morfologiya naseleniya" [Population Morphology], Rostov-na-Donu, 1929.
7. Darskiy, L. Ye. "Formirovaniye sem'i" [Formation of the Family], Moscow, 1972.
8. "Determinanty i posledstviya demograficheskikh tendentsiy" [Determinants and Consequences of Demographic Tendencies], Vol 1, Part 2, New York, 1973.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

9. "Itogi Vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1959 g. RSFSR" [Results of the All-Union Census of the Population of the RSFSR in 1959], Moscow, 1963.
  10. "Itogi Vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1970 g." [Results of the All-Union 1970 Census], Vol 7, Moscow, 1974.
  11. Kvasha, A.; Kiseleva, G. "The Reproduction Tendency in the Population of the USSR" in collection: "Vozobnovleniye pokoleniy nashey strany" [Renewing the Generations of Our Country], Issue 23, Moscow, 1978.
  12. "Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v.1965" [The National Economy of the USSR in 1965], Moscow, 1966.
  13. Nekrasov, N. N. "Regional'naya ekonomika" [Regional Economics], Moscow, 1978.
  14. Perevedentsev, V. "Snova o sem'ye" [Again About the Family], SMENA, 1978, no 10.
  15. "Problemy trudovykh resursov Kabardino-Balkarskoy ASSR" [Problems in Labor Resources of the Kabardino-Balkarskaya ASSR], edited by M. Ya. Sonin. Nal'chik, 1975.
  16. "Skol'ko detey budet v sovetskoy sem'ye" [How Many Children There Will Be in the Soviet Family], Moscow, 1977.
  17. Shevchenko, L. F. "The Equal Distribution of Public Consumer Funds Among Individual Administrative Rayons of the Northern Caucasus," in collection: "Razvitiye i rasmeshcheniye proizvoditel'nykh sil Severnogo Kavkaza" [The Development and Distribution of Production Forces in the Northern Caucasus], Rostov-na-Donu, 1972.
  18. VESTNIK STATISTIKI, 1971, no 12.
  19. VESTNIK STATISTIKI, 1975, no 12.
- COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Ylym". "Izvestiya Akademii nauk Turkmenskoy SSR, seriya obshchestvennykh nauk", 1979

8228  
CSO: 1823

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DEMOGRAPHY

ECONOMIC COSTS, EFFECTS OF RESETTLEMENT FROM RURAL AREAS WEIGHED

Moscow VESTNIK MOSKOVSKOGO GOSUDARSTVENNOGO UNIVERSITETA, SERIYA GEOGRAFIYA  
in Russian No 1, 1980 pp 97-100

[Article by A. I. Alekseyev, H. V. Zubarevich, and T. M. Regent: "An Attempted Study of the Effectiveness of the Resettlement of Residents of Rural Settlements in the Non-Chernozem Zone of the RSFSR"]

[Text] The nonconformity of the pattern of rural settlement in the non-Chernozem zone of the RSFSR with current economic and social requirements demands an attentive study. The small size of the settlements hinders concentration of production and the raising of the level of services for the rural population. At the present time various ways have been suggested for resolving the problem of dispersed settlement in the NChZ [non-Chernozem zone], but collective settlement, that is, the complete resettlement of residents from small nonprospective rural settlements into a few (1-2 per farm) large settlements equipped with public services is considered to be the most basic method. Although the process of collective settlement is examined in the given work, the authors, nevertheless, do not consider it to be the only way of reorganizing the dispersed rural settlement of the NChZ.

In order to determine the effectiveness of collective settlement in the non-Chernozem zone, we investigated eight farms in Vologodskaya Oblast, including four "unresettled" farms, where no work on collective settlement has been done at all, and four "collectively settled" farms, in which an organized intrafarm resettlement is being carried out (there did not turn out to be any completely resettled farm in Vologodskaya Oblast).

Of the "unresettled" we selected farms typical for the three zones of the oblast: southeast, northeast, and the western zone, and also farms typical for the suburban areas of the oblast center -- the city of Vologoda. These farms were approximately identical in the number and composition of the people, but differed from each other according to their economic and geographic position and communications with oblast and rayon centers. As far as those farms being "collectively settled" are concerned, the selection here was very limited although the authors in their basic work also attempted to trace the dependency between the socio-economic situation under conditions of collective settlement which had begun and the level of their

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

communications with local centers of dispersed settlements. All of the kol-khozes and sovkhoses of Vologodskaya Oblast in which collective settlement is being carried out are located in an area within 1-2 hours of transport accessibility to the oblast center. The process of collective settlement is practically nonexistent in peripheral territories.

Attempts to determine the direct economic effectiveness of collective settlement resulted in the following conclusion: The economic benefits (actual and potential) being obtained from the concentration of population are still much less than the expenditures needed for this process. Evidently, the greatest benefits to be gained are from the concentration of production for improving the management of a farm, but it is very difficult to turn this "share" into an economic and social effect, to which we are indebted for the concentration of the population.

The only debit item which is reduced during the process of collective settlement is the wage fund for administrative personnel, which is reduced as a result of the elimination of small farms, warehouses, and so on, expenditures for transportation, as a rule, increase since the distances for transporting fodder are increased as a result of the enlargement of farms. Expenditures for maintaining services are not reduced because, in the first place, it is very seldom that there are existing institutions for public services in settlements that are being collectively settled and, in the second place, even the elimination of a few small enterprises does not result in a reduction of expenditures for services. Inasmuch as the existing levels of services is insufficient, the necessary expenditure for the construction and operation of service oriented enterprises in future settlements are much greater than the savings resulting from the elimination of small enterprises. Other production and nonproduction expenditures also increase during the process of collective settlement.

The economic effectiveness of collective settlement may also be found in a reduction of the migratory efflux of the population from nonprospective settlements to locations beyond the farm. It was intended that the collective settlement process will change the structure of this migration and the major portion of those leaving small settlements will move to the prospective settlements of their own farm, that is, primarily to the farm center. However, it has turned out that in the farms being "collectively settled" the intensiveness and the direction of the efflux of migrants from nonprospective settlements exhibit practically no differentiation from the state of affairs in the "unresettled" farms.

A quite evident effect lies in the fact that the rate of the reduction of the number of people in the farms being collectively settled is slightly less than in the populated farms (respectively 1.5 and 2.1 percent annually). This takes place as a result of the more rapid growth of the prospective settlements, which, on the whole, takes place at the expense of migrants from other farms. The managers in the farms being collectively settled reason as follows: A family attracted from the outside means additional workers, but a resettled family does not change the balance of labor

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

resources. Besides, collective resettlement, of even those capable of working, is held back because of the large portion of elderly people among the population in nonprospective villages. It is not yet possible to resettle the whole population, it is only possible to resettle those families consisting of members capable of working, which means that the aged are to be left behind without any kind of assistance with respect to services (shopping and so on).

Besides, the advantages of prospective settlements are not yet so great that they would compensate for the inconveniences connected with moving, and the conditions for the cultivation of one's personal subsidiary plot are usually much better in nonprospective settlements.

Among the 200 resettled families questioned by us the overwhelming majority owned livestock for their personal use prior to the resettlement, but after resettlement -- less than half continued to own livestock. This was caused by two basic reasons: 1) the nature of the building and planning of the new settlements (multistory buildings, the absence of adjacent plots of land and suitable outside buildings); 2) a shortage of fodder due to the absence of pastures and hayfields near the new settlements. The first of these reasons is to be eliminated in accordance with the decisions of the July Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee (1978), but ways for resolving the second question are less clear. It turns out that as a result of resettlement fodder which was previously prepared by the people themselves near their own homes must now be acquired with considerably greater expenditures. Evidently, it is necessary to find ways to resolve this problem, otherwise the unwillingness on the part of the people to resettle into new settlements will become even greater.

The social effectiveness of resettlement first of all manifests itself in the fact that living conditions, on the whole, improve. Of the people resettled 77 percent consider that living conditions improved after resettlement. The basic portion of the resettled people is made up of young families, for whom the cultivation of a personal subsidiary plot was not so important<sup>1</sup>, and the higher level of services (for 95 percent of the resettled people) and improved working conditions (for 63 percent), on the whole, create much better living conditions than in the nonprospective settlements. The level of services and utilities for housing was also raised. For each 100 resettled families 63 percent have central heating, 90.5 percent -- gas and 67 percent -- indoor plumbing. Moreover, it should be noted that not one single resettled family previously had central heating or indoor plumbing, and only 7.5 percent had gas prior to resettlement. The age structure of the population is improving in the new population centers of the farms being resettled, the number of machine operators among all the people employed is increasing, and the number of workers involved in nonmechanized

1. True, the majority of such families receives products from the personal subsidiary plots of their parents, who continue to live in the nonprospective settlements; their houses are used as a kind of "dacha" [summer vacation home] for the children by many of the resettled families.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

work is decreasing. However, these changes in the structure of the population are not so great, which is primarily the result of the small scope of the resettlement program.

The authors attribute the fact that there has been no reduction in the migratory efflux from farms being resettled to the low rate of resettlement, which is in turn explained by the insufficient concentration of capital investments. In three of the four farms being resettled only 20-25 percent of all the necessary expenditures for resettlement were made in the last 10 years, and expenditures for resettlement amounted to an average of 40,000-60,000 rubles annually. In one farm alone -- the suburban Rodina Kolkhoz in Vologodskiy Rayon -- approximately 80 percent of all expenditures were made with an intensiveness of approximately 200,000 rubles annually, and here resettlement is approaching completion, the migratory efflux has become incomparably smaller. It should also be taken into consideration that in Vologodskaya Oblast no more than one-two tenths (of the approximately 400 farms) are being resettled, that is, farms similar to the one we studied, and in all the remaining farms there is practically, no resettlement at all.

The low rate of resettlement does not yet make it possible to evaluate the changes which are taking place in the structure of the intrafarm system of dispersed settlement. A reduction in the number of population centers is taking place in all the farms we studied basically at the expense of small centers not exceeding 25-50 residents, but the basic reason is not resettlement, but a migratory efflux and natural attrition. At the present time the majority of the rural population living in small peripheral settlements consists of elderly people no longer capable of working. This group no longer has any desire to forego the lifestyle to which it has become accustomed. As was noted above, from the point of view of economic effectiveness there is nothing to be gained from resettling pensioners in prospective population centers. However, one should not forget the social necessity of providing the rural aged with all necessary services. Here the utilization of portable types of services is the most rational.

The chief conclusion of our work: collective resettlement is economically and socially effective only when it is completely carried out within a reasonable period of time (not more than 10 years). When this process is dragged out over a protracted period of time and is accomplished at a slow rate, a reduction of population efflux is not observed at least within the first 10 years, nor is there an essential improvement of the population structure.

Let us repeat that we came to this conclusion on the basis of a "selection" from four farms being "resettled", of which only one is close to the completion of this process. Therefore, the results obtained must not be considered representative with absolute certainty. But the fact that only one farm in the whole oblast is completing the process of resettlement (we selected farms with the most intensive resettlement), attests to the very small scale of the program and its "general totality".

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

If our conclusion is correct, the following conclusion arises: The means for resettlement must be effectively concentrated in a few farms. But this is difficult because of social considerations: indeed, in this case we will place all the farms in a "line", in which the "last" one will receive its share in no earlier than 40 years, and until that time the differences in living conditions on the farms will become greater. One solution would be a sharp increase of capital investments in the nonproductive sphere in rural areas basically at the expense of redistributing general expenditures for the development of agriculture with an increase in the proportion of expenditures for the construction of housing and utilities.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Moskovskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta", 1980

10576  
CSO: 1828

END

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY